Monday, 20 January 2014

Not Quite The Last Word

When a company is accused of wrongdoing, who can it call to help repair its reputation?

These days, the answer has often been Gary G. Lynch, the former director of enforcement for the Securities and Exchange Commission. In 1994, Kidder, Peabody & Company chose Mr. Lynch, who is now a lawyer at Davis Polk & Wardwell, to look into whether one of its bond traders, Joseph Jett, created $350 million in phony profits. Bausch & Lomb Inc. recently asked him to investigate some questioned accounting practices. And in July, Mr. Lynch completed an investigation for Mattel Inc. into accusations that it was inflating its earnings.
The hiring of an outside lawyer to conduct an independent investigation is seen as a signal that a company accused of wrongdoing is committed to getting to the bottom of the situation. And Mr. Lynch, whose high-profile career at the S.E.C. involved bringing cases against Michael R. Milken and Ivan F. Boesky, lends a company not just his expertise in finding the facts but a golden reputation for integrity.

''Gary has an enormous degree of credibility with government officials,'' John M. Liftin, a senior vice president and general counsel for Kidder, said. ''They believe him. They trust him.''
But as much as companies would like the public to believe otherwise, Mr. Lynch's reports, which cleared top executives at Kidder and Bausch & Lomb, and exonerated Mattel, are not necessarily the last word. Critics note that Mr. Lynch was representing Kidder in a case against Mr. Jett even as he was conducting his fact-finding inquiry. Bausch & Lomb's board kept Mr. Lynch's report under wraps. So did Mattel, whose accusers objected that Mr. Lynch too readily shared information with Mattel during his inquiry.
While there is no evidence that Mr. Lynch failed to uncover the truth in these cases, experts say that independent investigations like Mr. Lynch's, even the most thorough and objective, are still no substitute for Government inquiries or court proceedings.
''There are certain inherent limitations on any effort,'' Richard C. Breeden, the former S.E.C. chairman, said.
Mr. Lynch strongly defended the quality of his work. ''I've worked very long and hard over a number of years to earn my credibility,'' he said. Although he declined to discuss the inquiries in detail, saying he was not authorized by his clients to do so, Mr. Lynch said that he would never do anything to ''tarnish or compromise'' his reputation.
Mr. Lynch is just one of several former Government officials whom companies have hired in hopes that these people's good names will help restore sullied corporate images. The group also includes Lynn Martin, a former Secretary of Labor; Griffin G. Bell, a former Attorney General, and Harvey Pitt, a former counsel at the S.E.C.

''Sometimes you do have to choose a name player to regain the credibility that has been stolen from you by the alleger,'' said Peter B. Frank, the vice chairman of Price Waterhouse L.L.P., which has helped companies look into charges of wrongdoing.
But critics say that a good name alone is not good enough. Shareholders and prospective investors are left at a loss to assess the quality of any inquiry, they say, unless important information about how an investigation was conducted and how the conclusions were reached is also disclosed. ''The idea that somehow the name alone is the answer is foolishness,'' said Neil V. Getnick, a lawyer in New York who has helped draft a series of guidelines for independent investigators.

''An investor,'' agreed Ralph V. Whitworth, a prominent shareholder advocate, ''can't find comfort in just the reputation of the investigator.''
Problems can arise because management may seem to have too keen an interest in the outcome or the investigator may appear to have a conflict that could affect his conclusions. Inquiries also vary greatly in quality, depending on the resources and latitude given the investigator.
''A lot of what is called an independent investigation is really advocacy,'' said Edwin H. Stier, a lawyer in Washington and in Bridgewater, N.J., who has conducted many of these investigations.

Mr. Lynch said he did not dispute the idea that his findings must often stand up to someone else's scrutiny, either that of regulators or of private plaintiffs' lawyers. ''In many instances, the results are tested in one way or another,'' he said. ''That's certainly their job to do it.''
Each of Mr. Lynch's investigations illuminates different points in the broader debate.
In the Kidder case, Mr. Lynch raised eyebrows because he conducted his investigation at the same time he was representing the brokerage in its arbitration case against Mr. Jett. ''The role of advocate and umpire is in tension,'' said John C. Coffee Jr., a professor of securities law at Columbia University.
Kidder, which was then a subsidiary of General Electric, filed an arbitration case in April 1994 with the New York Stock Exchange, asserting that ''Mr. Jett had been engaging in a scheme that created phantom profits.'' As Kidder's lawyer in the case, Mr. Lynch was required to serve as an advocate for the firm's views, which were that Mr. Jett acted alone and that Kidder was the victim of his actions.
Mr. Lynch said there was never any pretense that his inquiry, which he concluded that July, was purely independent, since Kidder had hired Davis Polk to represent it in the case against Mr. Jett. He described the inquiry as ''thorough and objective.''
And Mr. Liftin, Kidder's counsel, dismissed arguments that Mr. Lynch was wearing two hats at the same time. ''We don't think there was any conflict of interest,'' he said. ''I never took any of that seriously.''
Like any outside counsel, Mr. Lynch's investigation of Kidder was handicapped by his inability to subpoena documents or force the parties involved to talk and to punish them for lying. Mr. Jett, for example, refused to be interviewed.
Some questions arise, however, from what was left out of Mr. Lynch's 85-page public report. He concluded that Mr. Jett acted alone. But some interviews, disclosed in subsequent S.E.C. proceedings, at least raised a doubt about whether others at Kidder knew what Mr. Jett was doing and countenanced his actions. For example, according to notes from a Davis Polk interview, David Bernstein, who served as an assistant to the head of the fixed-income division, described the trading profits as ''not really false profits, rather advanced profits.''
''We didn't view it as false, just accelerated,'' he was quoted as saying.
The lawyer for Mr. Jett, Kenneth E. Warner, said, ''My client is an innocent man, and the report was grossly unfair to him.''
Mr. Lynch stands by his report. ''There is nothing in any of the interviews that is inconsistent with the facts,'' he said. And the S.E.C., which conducted its own investigation, essentially supported Mr. Lynch's conclusions and found that Mr. Jett's superiors were not responsible for anything but a lack of proper supervision. It has been two years since Mr. Lynch finished the investigation, and, he said, ''the conclusions in the report hold up extremely well.''
Mr. Lynch estimated that his firm billed Kidder for roughly 10,000 hours of work on the investigation, which, if billed in a conservative range of $200 to $300 an hour, would mean that Kidder may have spent $2 million to $3 million for legal services.
In contrast to the Kidder report, the Bausch & Lomb case raises questions about whether outsiders can trust an inquiry that remains largely cloaked. Mr. Lynch, who was brought in last fall to conduct an independent inquiry concerning accounting irregularities, reported directly to a special committee of the board, which was made up of independent directors. When he completed his investigation, most of what the public was told was contained in a few paragraphs in a company news release.
''The Special Committee found no evidence that any executive officer of Bausch & Lomb participated in or was otherwise aware of the irregularities that led to the restatement or any other irregularities within the scope of the Special Committee's review,'' the April release said. Earlier, the company restated its 1993 and 1994 financial reports.
But experts question whether such limited disclosure is enough. ''A report has value,'' Mr. Stier said, ''only to the extent that it can withstand attack from all conflicting opinions.''

In fact, Mr. Lynch did not actually write a report. Bausch & Lomb's board, which continues to be under investigation by the S.E.C., chose to have Mr. Lynch explain his findings orally. In general, such oral reports ''would have much less utility,'' Richard H. Walker, the general counsel for the S.E.C, said.
Neither Bausch & Lomb nor Mr. Lynch would comment on why there had been no written report.
''I've never seen a blue-ribbon panel do an investigation, make a report and then have nothing in writing,'' said Matthew Fusco, a lawyer who represents some shareholders in a suit against the company.
The other question that arises in such cases is just how independent the investigator is from management. In the Mattel case, Mr. Lynch reported to the board's audit committee about his investigation of charges by a former employee, Michelle Greenwald, that the company improperly accounted for certain transactions. When he finished in July, the committee issued a news release stating that the inquiry ''found no evidence that Mattel accounted for sales and costs associated with sales in a manner which is inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles.'' and that the company's accounting of certain royalty payments also conformed to those principles.
But questions were raised by Mr. Lynch's decision to forward quickly to Mattel officials a letter from Joel M. Kozberg, Ms. Greenwald's lawyer, outlining concerns about the investigation and referring to additional evidence. Mr. Lynch denied doing anything improper at the time, and Mattel said the letter was sent to it simply for follow-up. ''We saw this as entirely appropriate,'' said a company spokesman, Glenn Bozarth.
But Mr. Lynch's move, critics say, raised questions because the letter appeared to have been sent without Mr. Lynch's first examining it. ''It's something that should not happen,'' Barbara Ley Toffler, head of Arthur Andersen & Company's consulting business on ethics, said in an interview earlier this year.
The company released Mr. Lynch's findings a few days after receiving the letter.

Since details of the investigation were never disclosed, it is also unclear how Mr. Lynch arrived at his conclusions. There appears to be some contradictory evidence, including a summary of a slide presentation given by a Mattel executive, which describes two quarters of results as ''manufactured,'' according to an internal memo obtained by The New York Times. Another internal Mattel document called for the company to develop better systems to account for product-related costs associated with certain sales tactics.
While companies can always choose to conduct an internal inquiry, hiring an outside lawyer for an independent investigation calls for further safeguards, experts say. Not only is it important to emphasize the investigator's need for independence and an array of skills, as called for in the guidelines set forth by Mr. Getnick, but companies are also likely to find that investors and other interested parties will expect a fair disclosure of much of the evidence found during the inquiry.
''The most important thing,'' Mr. Pitt, the former S.E.C. counsel, said, ''is to restore confidence, both internally and externally.''

Sunday, 19 January 2014

Are Those Revenues For Real?

DON’T ASK STEPHEN COTUGNO WHAT HE THINKS of the accounting profession unless you are prepared for an earful. Executive vice president at Professional Detailing, an Upper Saddle River, N.J. firm that recruits and manages sales staffers for drug companies, Cotugno’s company had the embarrassment of having to chop 5% out of 1999 revenues after a confrontation with PricewaterhouseCoopers, the company’s auditor. Professional Detailing was including in revenues the reimbursements it gets from clients for placing help-wanted ads. The auditors went along with this little gimmick–until early this year. Amid a crackdown by the Securities & Exchange Commission on revenue recognition, the auditors decided the treatment of expenses was no longer kosher.
Small as the change was, Wall Street didn’t like the smell of audit trouble. Within a month of when Professional Detailing announced the revenue revision, its stock was down 31%.
“[Auditors] don’t know what the hell they’re doing,” fumes Cotugno. “They make this crap up a lot of the time.”
There’s some truth to the charge. Accountants have been fiddling with profit and loss rules for as long as there has been accounting. And now, with the SEC on the warpath over inflated revenue figures, companies and their outside auditors are on the defensive.
The agency has slapped enforcement actions on dozens of executives and companies, plus issued an all-points bulletin reminding businesses what existing rules require. Bear Stearns & Co. has identified 120 companies that have, in the past several months, announced that they have changed or will change their revenue recognition rules. Such companies as Alexion Pharmaceuticals and Genome Therapeutics confess that the changes will have an impact on their future earnings. Shareholders are forewarned.
“Companies making changes are acknowl-edging that their previous accounting policies were too aggressive,” says Howard Schilit, head of the Center for Financial Research & Analysis, accounting watchdogs in Rockville, Md.
For investors, revenue hyping can dig deep financial potholes. They may overpay for stocks of companies engaging in it. Further, to erase the excesses, companies are recording one-time charges and moving previously booked revenues into future quarters. That could make investors think a company’s operations suddenly improved. “Care must be taken to avoid giving companies credit for the same revenue twice,” says Bear Stearns’ Janet Pegg.
Ventro, a hot business-to-business Web site that includes in revenues the entire value of laboratory products it brokers, noted in recent SEC filings that any rule changes “could cause the market price of our common stock to fall significantly.” That’s the danger with these dot-coms that trade not on earnings but on revenues.
The danger is not to be underestimated. MicroStrategy, a high-flying software company developing Internet-related databases, was trading at $225 when we criticized its accounting (FORBES, Mar. 6). Within weeks the company scaled back its reported 1999 revenue from $205 million to $155 million. Now the stock is at $25.
Where else might trouble surface? Read on.
Revenues booked before contract completion. Physician & Hospital Systems & Services booked amounts for services not only before finishing the work but before mailing out bills. The concern, which does back-office work for doctors and hospitals, had been following that practice prior to when it was bought by National Data Corp. in Atlanta in December 1997, says David Shenk, chief financial officer of National Data. In fiscal 1999 National Data, a credit card and check processing company, reported $22.3 million in “unbilled accounts receivable,” up from $18.8 million the prior year. Now the unit books revenue only when it sends out bills. In its Nov. 30 fiscal quarter the company took a $13.8 million charge to fix this mess, turning a profit of 9 cents a share for the fiscal first half into a loss of 31 cents. Since the charge was announced in January, the stock has fallen 23% to $27.
A variation on this theme is booking revenues for loan services immediately instead of over the loan’s duration. First American Financial Corp., a Santa Ana, Calif. outfit that tracks borrowers’ property tax payments, was a bit too grabby here. A year ago the company announced it was taking a cumulative charge of $55.6 million in the first quarter of 1999. That knocked its 1999 profits down by 63% to $33 million from what would have been $88.6 million.
ITT Educational Services got caught, too. The Indianapolis company, which runs 68 technical institutes, had been immediately booking in revenue the fees it charges students to apply, register and use the laboratory. Now it’s going to spread out those fees over the average length of the program, which is two years, says Edward Hartigan, ITT’s senior vice president of investor relations. To fix past errors, ITT took a charge of $2.8 million in the Mar. 31 quarter, chopping earnings 70% to $1.2 million.
Membership fees prematurely recorded. Cendant, a firm in Parsippany, N.J. that is just surfacing from a massive accounting fraud, runs a time-share exchange program, Resorts Condominiums International, in which vacationers swap vacation spots. The company used to record up front about a third of the fees it charges. That made sense, it seemed, since this revenue offset the cost of setting up these memberships, which can last years. It doesn’t make sense now, with the SEC getting nasty. Cendant now says it will spread those fees over the life of the memberships. It also took a $56 million charge in the first quarter of 2000 to correct past problems, cutting the quarter’s net income 45% to $69 million.
MemberWorks, a Stamford, Conn. company that manages credit card membership award programs for companies like Sears and Citigroup, had been immediately booking in revenues the refundable fees paid by 6.2 million consumers to join its programs. Whoops! The company says it will reverse course this July and will spread those refundable fees over the membership terms. MemberWorks expects to take up to a $30 million one-time charge in July, which could vaporize its profits for the year.
Licensing fees reported prematurely. Software and biotech concerns that aren’t selling a lot of their own products rely on licensing revenues to make ends meet. How to account for them? It can get tricky.
Exelixis, a fast-track biotech concern in San Francisco, had been immediately recording revenues from licensing fees it charges big drug companies like Bayer, Bristol-MyersSquibb and Pharmacia to access its gene database to develop new drugs. To fix its errors, Exelixis recently erased $3.1 million in revenues in the first quarter of 2000. That’s a big chunk of change for Exelixis, which pulled in just $10.5 million in revenues last year and posted a loss of $18.7 million. It recently backed off from immediately recording a $10 million licensing deal from Bayer in the first quarter, and will spread that revenue out over the deal’s eight-year term.
Likewise, General Magic, a Sunnyvale, Calif. developer of telecommunications technology, said it overstated by $1.2 million the $5 million in revenue it had booked in the fourth quarter of 1999 for a fee General Motors paid to license its voice-interface system. In February it announced that it would recognize the revenue over the period of the license agreement. Little differences in revenue make a big difference in investor perceptions at a young company like this one. Since the announcement, General Magic’s stock has fallen 38% to $5.
How can you see these disasters coming? Often, you can’t. But one old rule of thumb in investing definitely applies here: Check out items like accounts receivables, unbilled receivables or deferred income in financial statements. If they are high or rising fast, be very wary.

Wednesday, 15 January 2014

2001 -For Polaroid,Bad News Seems To Be The Only News.

THROUGHOUT corporate America, the economic aftermath of Sept. 11 means hard times. For a company like the Polaroid Corporation, which was already well down the path to insolvency, it could mean the end of the road.
The sluggish economy was already causing trouble for photography companies, long before terrorism reared its head. For example, the Eastman Kodak Company said last week that its third-quarter earnings would be much lower than the company had anticipated, because of low sales in August. Now Kodak, like many film companies, finds its bleak outlook even bleaker, as travel and revelry -- prime picture-taking opportunities -- are in a slump.
But Kodak, Fuji, Canon and most other photography players will probably revive when the economy does. Analysts are not as optimistic about Polaroid.
''Polaroid just does not generate enough cash to make it through until the economy recovers, and Sept. 11 made it even less likely that the company will ever be healthy,'' said Gibboney Huske, a Credit Suisse First Boston analyst who dropped coverage of Polaroid stock in July because she no longer saw equity value in it.
The stock, which traded at $14.19 a year ago, closed yesterday at 49 cents a share, down 6 cents, on the New York Stock Exchange. About 17 percent of those penny-stock shares are owned by employees.
On Monday, the company, which is based in Cambridge, Mass., notified its employees that its pension fund had a $100 million shortfall, though Polaroid added that the fund's existing assets of more than $900 million would cover 90 percent of benefits.
Gary T. DiCamillo, Polaroid's chief executive since 1995, turned down requests for an interview, and no one at the company would speculate about its future.
Polaroid's problems have been a long time building. Financial missteps grew from maneuvers the company took in 1988 to duck a hostile takeover. And strategic blunders included a delayed reaction and a series of clumsy responses to the threat digital photography posed to Polaroid's chemical-and-paper instant pictures.
For years, though, the magnitude of those mistakes were not evident to the outside world. In February 1996 the company's management was promising Wall Street that by 2000 its annual sales would be more than $3.4 billion. In fact, last year's revenue was only $1.9 billion. The company began losing money in the third quarter of 2000, and the red ink keeps flowing.
Today, its credit and bond ratings are barely above junk grade. Polaroid has about $950 million in debt, more than half of it short term. Even though its banks have kept giving short-term waivers on principal repayments, the company's credit line will run out on Dec. 31. It has defaulted on several interest payments to bondholders and has $150 million in bonds that mature on Jan. 15.
Polaroid says the negotiations with its bondholders are going well, but if they break down, they could force the company into bankruptcy. Some analysts have suggested that Polaroid pre-empt such a move by filing for voluntary bankruptcy, or reach a deal with bondholders that would let it trade much of its debt for equity.
Other analysts expect either a financial investor or a camera company to buy Polaroid. Several point to Canon, which would welcome Polaroid's consumer distribution network, or to Olympus Optical, which already produces a hybrid digital and instant-film camera in partnership with Polaroid. Neither company would comment on the speculation.
''I expect by the time the year is out, the chairman will have resigned, Polaroid will have sold significant assets or the whole company, or bondholders will have clamped down,'' Ms. Huske said.
The real financial trouble dates to the hostile takeover attempted by Shamrock Holdings in 1988. Polaroid fought back by creating its employee stock plan, buying back shares and issuing preferred stock that was convertible to debt. Polaroid kept its independence, but by 1989 it was $600 million in debt -- $920 million, counting the preferred stock. It has rarely been debt-free since.
Analysts say Polaroid should have paid down the debt using some of the $925 million it received in 1991, when Kodak settled a patent violation suit. Instead, Polaroid tried to shore up its plunging stock by buying back shares, and to become more efficient by buying expensive resource planning software. Both moves pushed it further into a fiscal hole.
Nor was digital photography a sudden new threat. ''We'd known for 20 years that digital imaging was coming,'' said Carol Ulrich, a former president of commercial imaging who resigned in 1999 after 30 years with Polaroid.
Ms. Ulrich had suggested a year earlier -- when Polaroid shares were selling at about $42 -- that the company sell itself. But Polaroid's board chose a different path: it would slash costs and sell real estate; farm out manufacturing and bring in marketing partners; milk older products for cash to finance newer ones.
Polaroid's new instant cameras, like the JoyCam and the I-Zone, are selling well, but few analysts expect them to attain the popularity that instant cameras once had. ''Polaroid mistakenly thought its new cameras were growth businesses, when in fact they have half the life and half the consumption of the older ones,'' said Robert L. Renck, who runs the brokerage firm R. L. Renck & Company.
The company does have some promising new technologies -- notably, a couple of thermal printing processes that dispense with toners and inks. But these may be arriving too late.
While many other companies are now pegging problems to the Sept. 11 attacks, Polaroid might have trouble making that case. Consumers rarely took Polaroid's bulky cameras on vacations, for example, so canceled trips would have less impact on it than, say, Kodak or Fuji. And government agencies and private companies, fearful of terrorism, might have clamored to utilize Polaroid's considerable expertise in making picture ID's.
Mining that niche, though, has been more beneficial to a small company, Viisage Technology, which specializes in ID cards. Its shares soared from less than $2 on Sept. 10 to $9.80 last week before closing at $6.15 in Nasdaq trading yesterday -- even though Polaroid's $200 million annual ID business dwarfs Viisage's $26 million.
''Even if the ID business takes off, it'll be too little too late,'' Ms. Huske said.
Investors might not even notice an uptick, said Ulysses Yannas, an analyst with Buckman, Buckman & Reid. He noted that Polaroid has been talking about selling the ID unit to raise cash.
''The market knows that Polaroid has valuable assets,'' Mr. Yannas said, ''but it still thinks the company is kaput.''